1What the document states

The decision concerns a couple buying a property abroad through a solicitor based there. On 19 July 2019 they sent £377,528.09 in branch from their joint account to the solicitor’s euro account through a foreign exchange service provider, after a second member of staff advised them to telephone the provider to confirm the bank details, which they did. The receiving bank abroad would not process the funds, and they were returned to the provider and then to the couple’s account on 12 August 2019.1

On 13 August 2019 the couple made a branch payment of £377,498.09 to a new payee, alternative account details that had reached them by email from their apparent solicitor around 25 July. The bank says it completed a high value checklist, gave warnings and processed the payment as instructed. In early September they received emails apparently from the property owner asking for loans of £9,000 and £6,000 for a deposit on an onward purchase, and Mrs M paid both online. The owner knew nothing of the emails. The purchase did not complete and they incurred a €5,000 penalty.1

The Ombudsman upheld the complaint and applied the Contingent Reimbursement Model Code. On the branch payment the decision finds the bank had not shown a lack of reasonable basis for belief, since the couple had a long relationship with the solicitor, expected to pay again after the July funds were returned, and the email address difference was subtle. It finds the bank’s warning and fraud leaflet covered other scams and not email interception, and that a warning given in July would have failed the timeliness test because the loss had not yet occurred.1

2Elements recorded

Element As stated in the document Where in the document
Respondent Lloyds Bank PLC Heading
Branch payment £377,498.09 on 13 August 2019 to the alternative account Background facts
Online payments £9,000 on 2 September and £6,000 on 3 September 2019 Background facts
Total scam payments £392,498.09 Background facts
Recovered £213,958.49 in two sums in October and December 2019 Background facts
Bank’s position on the first payment Declined, citing an effective warning and no reasonable basis What the bank did
Bank’s position on the other two Accepted 50% liability and refunded £7,500 What the bank did
Finding on the Code No permitted exception applied, full reimbursement due Reasoning
Finding beyond the Code The bank should have recognised the risk of email interception and had a meaningful conversation Reasoning
Redress £171,039.60 with interest, £300 compensation, the €5,000 penalty in sterling and the £30 CHAPS fee Redress ordered
Evidence The bank could not provide the emails or the online banking audit records Reasoning

The decision also records that the bank relied on a court judgment on a bank’s duty before executing a payment instruction, and that the Ombudsman did not find that duty applied. It finds, on what was fair and reasonable apart from the Code, that a conversation explaining how email interception scams work and verifying the details on a trusted number would more likely than not have prevented the loss.1

4Check

The case shows a second payment sent to details that arrived after the first failed, so the check below is written for the payer whose payment has been returned.

  1. When funds are returned and you are asked to pay again, treat any new account details as unverified, even when you expected them.
  2. Confirm the details with your solicitor on a number you held before the return, not on a number or address in the new message.
  3. Compare the sender’s email address character by character with earlier messages. The decision records that the difference was subtle.
  4. Treat a request from a seller for a loan or an advance as a new request that needs its own check.
  5. Keep the emails and the record of any warnings the branch gave. The bank in this case could not produce its own records.

The page Before you pay sets out the general checks.

5Notes

Date.

The decision text carries no decision date. The date in this entry is the acceptance deadline.

Figures.

The decision states the July branch payment as £377,528.09 and the August payment as £377,498.09. The redress uses the second figure.

Code.

The Code applied because the bank is a signatory.

Outcomes.

This entry records one decision. It does not state how other complaints were decided.

Disclosure. Safe Payee is published and funded by Bulbea, which is named in this entry.
Sources
  1. Financial Ombudsman Service, Final decision DRN-3845234, ombudsman decision, DRN-3845234, 17 March 2023. Read 16 November 2026.